Top Incomes and Top Tax Rates : Implications for Optimal Taxation of Top Incomes in Finland by Riihelä, Marja et al.
  
 
 
 
T A M P E R E  E C O N O M I C  W O R K I N G  P A P E R S  
N E T  S E R I E S  
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOP INCOMES AND TOP TAX RATES: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR OPTIMAL TAXATION OF TOP INCOMES IN FINLAND 
 
 
Marja Riihelä 
Risto Sullström 
Matti Tuomala 
 
 
 
Working Paper 88 
May 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 
FI-33014 UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE, FINLAND 
 
 
ISSN 1458-1191 
ISBN 978-951-44-9402-4 
Top Incomes and Top Tax Rates: Implications for
Optimal Taxation of Top Incomes in Finland
Marja Riihela - Risto Sullstrom - Matti Tuomala
Abstract
We apply optimal top marginal tax rate formulas with alternative social prefer-
ences to the Finnish economy using evidence on the responsiveness of top incomes
in Finland to changes in top tax rates that have taken place in Finland over the
last 30 years. Based on the Finnish income distribution data (cross section) we
estimated by using maximum likelihood method several two and three parameter
distributions. Among two parameter distributions the Champernowne one is the
best tting for the pre-tax income distribution in Finland (1990-2010). We also
recognize that there is much uncertainty particularly related to labour supply
elasticity and do not simply rely on the central point estimate. It is safe to
conclude from our application that the current top marginal tax rate in Finland
is not close to the top of the Dupuit-Laer curve.
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1 Introduction
The increasing share of the top income earners in total income has been
a notable feature of the changes in income inequality in English speaking
countries while in Europe Netherlands, France and Switzerland and Japan
display hardly any change in top income shares1. This trend toward income
concentration has also taken place in the Nordic countries, traditionally low
inequality countries. The top percentile disposable income share in Finland
doubled in the latter part of 1990s. At the same time, top tax rates on upper
income earners have declined signicantly in many OECD countries, again
particularly in English speaking countries.2 This is also the case in Finland
(see Figures 1 and 2). Economists have formulated several hypotheses about
causes of increasing inequality, but there is not a fully compelling explanation.
For example, Atkinson et al. (2011) emphasise that it's very dicult to
account for these gures with the standard labour supply, labour demand
explanation. Hence we really have to think about things like social policies
and progressive taxation.
Optimal income tax literature provides a striking result on the top
marginal tax rate. The optimal marginal tax rate for the highest-wage per-
son is zero. This result - due to Phelps-Sadka - really says that the highest
income that could possibly happen should be subject to a zero marginal tax
rate. Strictly speaking, this result applies only to a single person at the very
top of the income distribution, suggesting it is a mere theoretical curiosity.
Moreover, it is unclear that a \top earner" even exists. For example, Saez
(2001) argues that \unbounded distributions are of much more interest than
bounded distributions to address the high income optimal tax rate problem."
Without a top earner, the intuition for the zero top marginal rate does not
apply, and marginal rates near the top of the income distribution may be
positive and even large. Calculations in Tuomala (1984) show that the zero
rate is not a good approximation for high incomes.
In Mirrlees (1971) all wage distributions were unbounded above and there-
fore he did not have a zero rate result. He in turn presented precise conjec-
tures about optimal tax rates in the case of utility functions separable in
consumption and labour. One of the least well known features of Mirrlees
(1971) paper is the demonstration (pages 189-200) that the optimal marginal
tax rate converges to a positive value when the upper tail of the skill dis-
1The more recent estimates of Camille Landais (2007) show a rise in recent years in
France.
2Piketty et al. (2011) investigates the link between skyrocketing inequality and top tax
rates in OECD countries. They nd a strong correlation between tax cuts for the highest
earners and increases in the income share of the top 1 per cent since 1975.
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tribution is of Paretian form, with this value being a function of the Pareto
parameter and the characteristics of the utility function. It appears that the
role of the latter depends solely on their appearance in the constraints, and
does not depend on them entering the government's objective function. It is
also important to note that the key assumptions behind asymptotic marginal
tax results are that either the marginal utility of consumption or the social
marginal valuation of utility goes to zero when the wage rates tend to innity
(see also Dahan and Strawczynski, 2012). In this situation we need only in-
formation on labour supply elasticities and the shape of the skill distribution
to determine the optimal top marginal income tax rate.
The distribution of top incomes is a central part in determining top
marginal tax rates. Tony Atkinson (2012, p. 774) wrote recently:
\Economists tend to assume that it is e (the elasticity) that is the core of their
subject, but equally central should be a (the distribution). This is particularly
the case where the distribution of top incomes is becoming more concentrated
in the form of a lower value for a (the Pareto parameter), implying a higher
optimal top tax rate".
Because one of the key factors explaining the shape of an optimal income
tax schedule and top marginal tax rates is the assumed family of distribu-
tions of earning abilities, it is of interest to look at other distributions than
the lognormal and the Pareto distribution. As commonly known the lognor-
mal distribution ts reasonable well over a large part of income range but
diverges markedly at both tails. The Pareto distribution in turn ts well at
the upper tail. Champernowne (1952) proposes a model in which individ-
ual incomes were assumed to follow a random walk in the logarithmic scale.
Tuomala (2006) replaces the lognormal distribution by the Champernowne
distribution3. Specically he uses the two parameter version of the Champer-
nowne distribution, also known as the Fisk-distribution. This distribution
approaches asymptotically a form of Pareto distribution for large values of
wages but it also has an interior maximum.
Finally, the relevant elasticities are crucial for optimal marginal tax rates.
If high-income workers are particularly elastic in how their taxable income
decreases with higher tax rates, this would imply lower optimal marginal
tax rates on high incomes, all else the same. Saez (2001) used a constant
labour supply elasticity formulation not because there was strong empirical
evidence for it, but because there was no strong evidence against it. However,
since the Saez (2001) paper, the survey by Roed and Strom (2002) provides
some evidence for labour supply elasticity declining with income for Nor-
3It is often - also in an earlier version of this paper - referred to as the Fisk distribution
(see Fisk, 1961 and also Bevan, 2005).
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way. Roed and Strom (2002) oer a review of the evidence. They conclude
that the limited evidence indicates that labour supply elasticities are declin-
ing with household income. Using Norwegian data Aaberge and Colombino
(2006) provides support for declining elasticities. By contrast, there is em-
pirical evidence on the elasticity of taxable income that higher elasticities are
among high income individuals. Feldstein (1995) estimated large elasticities
of taxable income with respect to tax rates among high earners. Gruber and
Saez (2002) subsequently estimated smaller elasticities, but their estimates
also support the hypothesis that the elasticity increases with income. But
as with the distribution of abilities and the social welfare function, there is
much debate over the true pattern of elasticities by income.
In this paper we apply top (asymptotic) marginal tax rate formulas to the
Finnish case using empirical estimates on taxable income elasticity estimates
and the distribution of pre-tax income. In the empirical part of this paper we
derive the optimal marginal tax rates using evidence on the responsiveness of
top incomes in Finland to changes in tax rates, based on the response of top
incomes that have taken place in Finland over the last 30 years. We focus
on two key tax reforms of 1988/89 and 1993.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes
optimal marginal top tax rates in the Mirrlees model in the case of quasi-
linear preferences, a Pareto distribution of skills and constant labour supply
elasticities. We also analyze an asymptotic solution in the case with the
Cobb-Douglas preferences and the distribution with the Pareto tail. Section
3 describes the data and estimation results on labour supply elasticities and
pre-tax inequality. In Section 4 we estimate the distribution of top incomes
for the Finnish case. Section 5 applies the optimal top tax formulas in order
to assess what the optimal taxation of top incomes is in Finland. Section 6
concludes.
2 Optimal top income tax rates in the Mirrlees model
There are a continuum of taxpayers, each having the same preference order-
ing, which is represented by a utility function
u = U(x) + V (1  y) = x+ V (1  y) (1)
where x is a composite consumption good and hours worked are y, with
Ux = 1 and Vy < 0 (subscripts indicating partial derivatives) and where
V () is convex. Workers dier only in their exogenously given productivity
or ability, denoted by n they can earn. There is a distribution of n on
3
the interval [0;1) represented by the density function f(n). Gross income
z = ny.
Suppose that the aim of policy can be expressed as maximizing the fol-
lowing social welfare criterion
W =
Z 1
0
G(u(n)) f(n) dn; (2)
where G() is an increasing and concave function of utility. The government
cannot observe individuals' productivities and thus is restricted to setting
taxes and transfers as a function only of earnings, T (z(n)). x = ny   T (ny)
where T () symbolizes the income tax, which is dened on total income since
the wage n and the supplied amount of labour y(n) are not observed by the
government.
The government maximizes W subject to the revenue constraintZ 1
0
T (z(n)) f(n) dn = R; (3)
where in the Mirrlees tradition R is interpreted as the required revenue for
essential public goods. The more non-tax revenue a government receives
from external sources, the lower is R. In addition to the revenue constraint,
the government faces incentive compatibility constraints. These in turn state
that each n individual maximizes utility by choice of hours of work.
Diamond (1998) shows that when preferences satisfy (1) and labour sup-
ply elasticity  is constant4, the optimal marginal taxes must satisfy (see the
derivation in the appendix A)
t
1  t =

1 +
yVyy
Vy
 
[1  F (n)]
nf(n)
 R1
n
[1  ']f(p)dp
(1  F (n))

: (4)
Denoting by  the multiplier of the government budget constraint we dene
the social marginal welfare weight on taxpayer n as 'n =
G0(u)

, where  =R1
0
G0[U(x)]f(p)dp. In other words the Lagrange multiplier  is equal to the
population average of G0[u(n)]. Hence welfare weights 'n =
G0(u)

are average
to one.
For any social welfare function G with a property that limu!1G0(u) = 0,
and individual preferences represented by u = x   [y1+ 1 ]=[1 + 1

], then the
integral in (4) asymptotically converges to 1 and t(n)
1 t(n) converges to
t(n)
1  t(n) =

1 +
1


1  F (n)
nf(n)
:
4Note in the quasi-linear case  = 1 + 1=c, where c is the compensated elasticity of
labour supply.
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In the case of the unbounded Pareto distribution, f(n) = 1
n1+a
for a >
0; 1 F (n)
nf(n)
= 1
a
is constant. Assuming a Pareto distribution of skills above the
modal skill (see Diamond,1998), the asymptotic optimal marginal tax rate is
given by
lim
n!1
t(n)
1  t(n) =

1 +
1


1
a
(5)
where a is the Pareto coecient. Hence
t =
1
1 + a=
where  =

1 +
1


(6)
is an explicit formula for the optimal top income tax rate. Assuming that
the average social marginal welfare weight among top bracket income earners
is zero allows us to obtain an upper bound on the optimal top tax rate.
Hence the formula (6) gives revenue maximizing tax rate. If we assume the
\Rawlsian" social objective5, a Pareto distribution and preferences are quasi-
linear then the pattern of marginal tax rates depends only on [1 F (n)]
nf(n)
, that
is, on the shape of the n-distribution. We have the same formula as in (6).6 7
Saez (2001) provides a simple derivation of top income tax rate t in terms
of gross income z based on approximation. The government chooses t to
maximize tax revenue R from the top bracket (as the government puts no
marginal social welfare weight on top bracket earners)8; R = t(zm(1 t) z).
5Maximizing utility of the worst o person in the society is not the original version of
Rawls (1971). It is a kind of welfarist version of Rawlsian. \To interpret the dierence
principle as the principle of maximin utility (the principle to maximize the well-being of the
least advantaged person) is a serious misunderstanding from a philosophical standpoint."
Rawls (1982).
6Hence using the Rawlsian social welfare function we do not obtain the rising part of
the U-shaped marginal tax rates as in Diamond (1998).
7Here we have a version of the Rawlsian social welfare function, where the maximand
is the welfare of the worst o individual. This is a very standard interpretation in public
economics. We could, however, adopt a dierent version. Rawls (1971, p. 98) writes
\One possibility is to choose a particular social position, say that of the unskilled worker,
and then to counts the least advantaged of those with the average income and wealth of this
group, or less. The expectation of the lowest representative man is dened as the average
taken over this whole class. Another alternative is a denition solely in terms of relative
income and wealth with no reference to social position. Thus all persons with less than
half of the median income and wealth may be taken as the least advantaged segment". It
is some interest to note that if the Pareto distribution applies over the whole range of n
and the maximand of the Rawlsian social welfare function is the welfare of those below
the poverty line, the optimal marginal tax rate is increasing up to the poverty line. The
importance of this observation undermines the fact that the t of Pareto distribution over
the whole range of income turns out to be quite poor.
8Alternatively, assume one wants to increase the marginal tax rate from t to t+dt over
5
z is a threshold and zm is the mean income of those with incomes above z.
In other words, if z is a threshold above which a hypothetical top rate of
tax applies, then the mean income of those aected is zm, and zm  z is the
amount of income over which the new tax rate applies.
The rst order condition is t dzm
d(1 t) = zm   z. Dividing by zm we have
tdzm(1  t)
(1  t)zmd(1  t) = 1 
z
zm
(7)
where at the left hand side we have the elasticity of income in the top bracket
with respect to the net-of-tax rate 1  t. This is essentially the same formula
as the formula (14) in Tuomala (1985) in the linear optimal income tax model.
The revenue maximizing top rate that applies above the threshold z is given
by t
1 t = 1  z

zm
or
t =
1
1 + =I
(8)
where I = 1   z
zm
is a measure of inequality. But if the distribution of
top incomes has a Pareto distribution then t is independent of the threshold
z. This will hence approximately be true for large z. Assuming that the
average social marginal welfare weight among top bracket income earners is
zero allows us to obtain an upper bound on the optimal top tax rate. Hence
the formula (7) gives revenue maximizing tax rate. The Pareto distribution
has an important connection with van der Wijk's law. The average income
zm above the level z
 is proportional to z itself, i.e. or
z
zm
=
a  1
a
(see for example the discussion in Cowell, 1977). Hence we have t = 1
1+a
.
2.1 Utilitarian social preferences and top tax rates
One may argue that it is too extreme to put zero asymptotic welfare weight at
the top earners. For example Feldstein (2012) argues that it is repugnant to
some income bracket [z; z + dz]. Then tax revenues go from R to R+ dR, with:
dR = [1 H(z)] dt dz   h(z) dz t
0  z dt
1  t
(h(z) is the density function for labour income, and H(z) is the distribution function).
dR = 0 if and only if
t
1  t =
1 H(z)
z h(z)
:
6
set weights in this way. Alternatively we might assume that ' has a positive
lower bound which is approached as n rises without limit. Of course it is not
obvious how to determine a positive lower bound. Given the lower point of
' the optimal rate is now
t = (1  ')=(1  '+ a); (9)
with the Pareto distribution. The optimal top marginal tax rate is decreasing
with the elasticity  and the social marginal welfare weight on top earner '
and decreasing in the Pareto parameter a. This rate is also less than the
revenue maximizing rate with the same inequality parameter and elasticity.
2.2 The top tax rate and income eects
Saez (2001) also shows that the main results of Diamond (1998) can be
generalized to preferences with income eect. Saez (2001) presents a formula
for the optimal top tax rate for a more general setting based on an approxi-
mation. The welfare-maximizing top rate in the highest tax bracket equals
t = (1 ')=(1 'a c  ) where ' < 1 is the social marginal welfare weight
for top-income earners (it measures the social value in euros of transferring
a marginal euro to an income earner in the top-tax bracket) and c is the
compensated elasticity of taxable income,  is the income elasticity, and a
is the Pareto parameter of the earnings distribution. Equation is therefore
an explicit formula for the optimal asymptotic top income tax rate if the
social welfare weight is taken as exogenous. As in Diamond (1998), Dahan
and Strawczynski (2012) rely on the direct limit argument i.e. the limit
of optimal non-linear marginal tax rates when the wage tends to innity9.
They show that Diamond's asymptotic tax formula is not limited to the
linear case and can be used for the non-linear utility of consumption as well.
Dahan and Strawczynski (2012) also replicates the optimal asymptotic tax of
Mirrlees (1971: equation 66) but in terms of labor supply elasticities instead
of marginal utilities (see footnote 5 above).
2.3 The asymptotic solution
As noted by Mirrlees (1971) the asymptotic marginal tax rates are sensitive
to the nonlinear utility of consumption. Above in (6) we assume that utility
of consumption is linear. If the marginal utility of consumption takes the
9Most relevant cases of asymptotic tax rates were already analyzed by Mirrlees (1971,
p. 188-193).
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form of Ux = x
  then the asymptotic marginal tax rates are sensitive to the
value of  in the neighbourhood of 1. For example with a constant labour
supply elasticity and Ux = x
 2 the formula (9) in Saez (2001) yields the opti-
mal asymptotic rate equal to 100 per cent (see also Dahan and Strawczynski
(2012)). Mirrlees (1971) devoted much attention to the case where the utility
function is of the Cobb-Douglas form, u = log x+ log (1  y), the social wel-
fare function is isoelastic, and skills are lognormally distributed or according
to the Pareto distribution. The Marginal tax rate with the Pareto distribu-
tion tends asymptotically to 2
1+
as n tends to innity, where  is the shape
parameter or Pareto parameter. This is also true for the Champernowne
distribution (see Section 4). We give more complete description of the solu-
tion than in Mirrlees (1971, case ii p. 196-200) in the case of the Pareto or
Champernowne distribution. When the path to the singular solution starts
from y = 0, this implies that the marginal tax rates increase monotonically
from t = 1
(1+)
to t = 2
(1+)
, where  is the shape or Pareto parameter in
the Champernowne distribution (see the derivation in the appendix B). It is
also important to note that these asymptotic results are independent of the
net revenue requirement. Interestingly, the same asymptotic value holds -
for the current skill distribution and preferences10 - both in the Rawlsian or
maximin and utilitarian cases as long as the marginal utility of consumption
goes to zero as wage goes to innity. In other words, although the shapes
of the respective marginal tax schedules dier radically in the maximin and
utilitarian cases at the lower end of the income distribution, they converge
at the upper end.11 This is not surprising. In the utilitarian case the weight
attached to the top incomes tend to zero when n goes innity. This is also in
the case where the government minimizes some well-behaved poverty index.
Of course, this convergence may not be apparent over the income range of
practical interest. Whether this is the case, it will emerge in the numerical
simulations provided below.
3 The taxable income elasticity at the top in Finland
Empirical work on the incentive eects of labour income taxation has gen-
erally identied quite low labour supply elasticities. Much of this research
has analyzed labour supply in terms of hours. Compensated elasticities have
often been found to be near 0.1 or 0.2, which implies that the elasticity of
10Mirrlees (1971) notes this in a footnote on the page 200.
11In fact this is also true in numerical simulations. Tuomala (2006) shows that both in
maximin and utilitarian cases the marginal tax rates are almost the same at the 99 per
cent point of the skill distribution.
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substitution between leisure and consumption is around 0.5 in the CES utility
function. It has been long recognised that behavioural responses of taxation
are not conned to participation and hours worked. Feldstein (1995) pro-
posed that we should examine the response of taxable income to changes
in tax rates. Taxable income is determined not only by hours and partic-
ipation. Individuals can respond to taxation on other margins such as job
choice, intensity of work, timing of compensation, tax avoidance and tax eva-
sion. Feldstein (1995) found very high elasticities exceeding one. Subsequent
research generated considerably smaller estimates. In the recent survey on
taxable income elasticities, Saez et al. (2012) conclude:
\The most reliable longer-run elasticity estimates range from 0.1 to 0.4, sug-
gesting that the U.S. top marginal rate is far from the top of the Laer
curve, but greater than one would calculate if the sole behavioural response
was labour supply".
Much attention has been devoted to the eects of top marginal tax rates
on the earnings distribution. As pointed out by Atkinson et al. (2009)
higher top marginal tax rates can reduce top reported earnings through dif-
ferent channels. In particular, it has long been shown that the bulk of the
elasticity response for top incomes comes from income shifting between var-
ious tax bases. For instance, lower capital income tax rates might lead to a
rise in top taxable incomes reported as capital income, but this rise can be
almost entirely oset by a corresponding decline in taxable earned income
reported to the labour income tax. Jantti et al. (2009) argue that the 1993
reform, which introduced dual income taxation, had an impact on the level
and composition of top incomes12. Figure 1 documents a surge in capital in-
comes (mainly dividends) of top 1 per cent starts just after the 1993 reform.
Figure 1 also shows that top tax rates on upper income earners have declined
signicantly after the 1993 reform. There is not much change in the compo-
sition of incomes among the next 4 per cent. The gap between the tax rates
on labour and capital income was huge after the 1993 reform13. The dual
income tax dropped the marginal tax rates on capital income the more the
higher was the person's total income before the reform. Those entrepreneurs
who saw the largest reduction in the marginal tax rates on capital income
also experienced the largest increase in capital income. At the same time,
the share of labour income decreased for these taxpayers. The increase in
12The proportion of capital income was in 2007 53 per cent of income in the top one per
cent group (Figure 1). It was 11 per cent in 1990.
13\The (Finnish) system seems to oer generous opportunities for tax-avoidance by
transforming labor income into capital income. For example, retained corporate prots
will increase the amount that is taxed as capital income, and capital gains on shares are
only subject to capital income tax". Lindhe et al. (2002).
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Figure 1: Marginal tax rate and gross income items for top 1 per cent, 95-99
percentile and bottom 95 percentiles
the share of capital income out of total income was much more modest for
high-income employees.
The Finnish reform of 1993 sharply reduced the marginal tax rates on
capital income to some corporate owners but did not change simultaneously
the taxation of labour income. Corporate owners who can aord to save can
reduce their intertemporal tax bill by taking less labour income out of the
rm, which increases the net worth of the company. The increased value
of net assets, in turn, increases the share of dividends that can be paid tax
free in the future. People who are not owners of closely held corporations do
not have an access to this route. Pirttila and Selin (2010) examine whether
the responses to the Finnish dual income tax reform of 1993 were dierent
10
among entrepreneurs and employees. The idea is that entrepreneurs have
more leeway for income shifting than employees. They rst make the tax
base as constant as possible so that legislation changes governing the tax
base would not distort our inference. They then estimate, using the approach
in the elasticity of taxable income literature (for this, see e.g. Gruber and
Saez (2002) and Aarbu and Thoresen 2001), how taxable capital and labour
income reacted to changes in the marginal tax rates on labour and capital
income.
In any case, the key point is that most of the behavioural response of top
incomes to top tax rates seems to be due not to a real change in economic
activity and output, but simply to a re-labelling of income outlays over var-
ious tax bases. Using the terminology introduced by Saez et al. (2012) in
their survey, the behavioural response of top incomes involves substantial
tax externalities which like all externalities have an impact on welfare and
policy analysis. In general the literature estimates this elasticity based on
the sum of labour and capital income. Top income shares together with in-
formation on marginal tax rates by income groups can be used to test theory
and estimate the taxable elasticity.
The most dramatic changes in marginal income tax rates in Finland have
taken place at the top percentile of the income distribution (Figure 2). Figure
11 in appendix C displays the average marginal tax rates and income shares of
the next 4 per cent (income earners between the 95th and the 99th percentile).
These gures show that the marginal tax rates by the top 1 per cent have
declined since 198814. It is interesting to note that the share received by the
top 1 per cent of income recipients started to increase after 1993 not after
1989. In contrast to that for the next 4 per cent, the marginal tax rates
of labour income and total income after 1993 dier only slightly from each
other. This implies that income shifting possibilities are quite modest for
this group.
Using the series displayed in Figures 1 and 2 and in appendix Figure 10
we can estimate the elasticity of taxable income around a tax reform episode
taking place between pre-reform year and post-reform year as follows
 =
(logS1   logS0)
log(1  t1)  log(1  t0) ; (10)
where S1 the top 1 per cent income share after reform and S0 before reform, t0
the marginal tax rate (earned and capital) of the top 1 per cent before reform
and t1 the marginal rate after reform. (1  t) (or 1-MTR as in appendix D)
is the net-of-tax rate. Here we assume that absent tax changes S0 = S1.
14See more closely the denition of the tax rates in Appendix C.
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Figure 2: Marginal tax rates and income shares for top 1 per cent
Applying this simple method using series depicted in Figures 1, 2 and 10
above around the 1989/90 tax reform by comparing 1989 and 1991 generates
an elasticity of 0.13 for the top 1 per cent (column 2).15 Column 3 in Table 1
shows that the elasticities for the next 4 per cent. Comparing 1992 and 1995
around the tax reform 1993 gives a much larger elasticity of 0.69 for the top
1 per cent. It shows that the elasticity estimates obtained in this way are
sensitive to a specic reform.
We also estimate the elasticity using the full time series evidence. We
estimate the elasticity e with a log-form regression specication of the form:
log(Top Income Share) = constant+ e log(1  t) + " (11)
15The elasticity estimates in Pirttila and Selin (2011) for the mean income fall in range
0.2-0.4.
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Table 1 Elasticity estimates using top (1 per cent) income share series
in Finland 1980-2010a
Top 1 % Top 1 % Top 95-99 %
DDb using the Simple Simple
next 4 % dierence dierence
as control
(1) (2) (3)
A
The tax reform episodes
1989 vs. 1991 (Tax reform 1989/90) 0.32 0.13 0.01
1992 vs. 1995 (Tax reform 1993) 0.49 0.69
B
Full time series 1980-2010
No time trends 1.31 0.67 0.06
(5.43) (9.55) (2.42)
Linear time trend 1.31 0.81 0.00
(5.30) (4.59) (0.03)
a t-values in the parentheses.
b DD = dierence in dierences.
Such a regression without time trend yields a very high estimate of the elas-
ticity of 0.67 for the top 1 per cent. For the next 4 per cent the estimated
elasticity is rather small 0.06. Inequality has also changed for the reason
not related to taxation. To take into account these other considerations we
could add some controls. This is not an easy task. We added time trends to
(11). A combination of linear, square, and cube time trends did not improve
the model. As pointed out by Saez et al. (2012) the problem with time-
trend specication is that we do not know what time trend specications are
necessary for non-tax related changes.16
We also have what is referred to as a dierence in dierences estimates.
These are presented in column (1) of table 1. For that we assume, absent
the tax change, the top 1 per cent share would have increased as much as
the next 4 per cent.17 These estimates are rather high for the full time-series
regression and they don't change with dierent time trends.
However there is a great deal of uncertainty around these numbers. The
elasticity is estimated using changes to top incomes that happened during
16See also Piketty, T., E. Saez and S. Stantcheva (2011).
17
 =
log(S1=S
k
1 )  log(S0=Sk0 )
log[(1  t1)=(1  tk1)]  log[(1  t0)=(1  tk0)]
where tk and Sk are the marginal tax rate and the income share for the control group, top
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the 1990s, a period when the top rate of income tax was falling and when
income inequality was increasing. This approach may then confuse responses
to the policy with any underlying factor (e.g. income shifting18) increasing
inequality, this could mean that our elasticity estimates are too high. This is
especially true for the DD full time series regression. Namely income shifting
was possible in practice for the top 1 per cent taxpayers. We should also bear
in mind that the taxable income elasticity is not derived from immutable
preferences, but are aected by the structure of tax system (see Kopczuk
and Slemrod, 2002).
4 Distribution of top incomes: Estimation of the
Pareto and Champernowne-Fisk distributions
The excellent Pareto t of the top tail of the distribution has been well
known for over a century since the pioneering work of Pareto (1896) and
veried in many countries and many periods, as summarized in Atkinson et
al. (2011). The top tail of the income distribution is closely approximated
by a Pareto distribution characterized by a power law density of the form
f(z) = (1=z1+a) where a > 1 is the Pareto parameter. Such distributions
have the key property that the ratio zm=z
 is the same for all z in the top
tail and equal to b = a
a 1 . z
 is the top x per cent threshold income and zm
is the average income of top x per cent. The higher a (i.e. lower coecient
a
a 1 , (i.e. less fat upper tail) imply lower inequality, and conversely (b = in-
verted Pareto parameter). A lower coecient means larger top income shares
and higher income inequality. In Finland 1990-2010 the Pareto parameter
(taxable income) varies between 3.7 (1994) and 1.79 (2004) (see Figure 3).
Figure 4 depicts the ratio zm=(zm   z), with z ranging from zero to
300 000 euros annual incomes in 2000, 2005 and 2010. The ratios in dierent
years show that top tail of the distribution is very well approximated by a
Pareto distribution (see also Figure 4). Especially this is so in 2010. Then
the ratio was 2.4. The top 1 per cent threshold z was 99 398 euros and zm
was 175 680 euros in 2010. In 1990 the top 1 per cent threshold started at
70 605 euros, and the average income of people in that bracket was 97 146
euros, then a = 3.66.
95-99 percentiles. And a log-form regression specication of the form:
[log(
S1
Sk1
)  log(S0
Sk0
)] = constant+ e [log(
1  t1
1  tk1
)  log( 1  t0
1  tk0
)] + "
(see Appendix D).
18Figure 1 provides indirect evidence on income shifting within the top 1 per cent.
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Figure 3: Empirical Pareto coecient, a, in Finland 1990-2010. z is the top
1 per cent threshold income and zm is the average income of top 1 per cent
2
3
4
e
ff
ic
ie
n
t 
 z
m
/(
z m
!z
*
)
0
1
0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000 300000 350000
P
a
re
to
 c
o
e
2010 2005 2000
Figure 4: Pareto coecient a = zm=(zm   z)
We now consider an alternative to the Pareto distribution. Champer-
nowne (1952) proposes a model in which individual incomes are assumed to
follow a random walk in the logarithmic scale. Here we use the two parame-
ter version of the Champernowne distribution. This distribution approaches
asymptotically a form of Pareto distribution for large values of wages but
it also has an interior maximum. As for the lognormal, the Champernowne
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Figure 5: The shape parameter  (with condence interval): Champernowne-
Fisk distribution
distribution exhibits the following features: asymmetry, a left humpback and
long right-hand tail; but it has a thicker upper tail than in the lognormal
case. The probability density function of the Champernowne distribution is
h(z) =  [
m z 1
(m + z)2
] (12)
in which  is a shape parameter and m is a scale parameter. The cumulative
distribution function is
H(z) = 1  m

m + z
(13)
For the distribution or Mills ratio:
lim
n!1
1 H(z)
z h(z)
= lim
n!1
m + z
z
! 1

: (14)
Equation (14) conrms that the Champernowne distribution approaches
asymptotically a form of Pareto distribution for large values of wages.
Based on Finnish income distribution data (cross section) we estimated
by using maximum likelihood methods several two and three parameter
distributions with corresponding measures of goodness of t (several of them
plus the log-likelihood value for the estimated model). Among two param-
eter distributions the Champernowne is the best tting for pre-tax income
distribution in Finland (1990-2010). The -parameter varies from 2.78 to
2.4 (see Figure 5). Over the period from the latter part of 1990s to 2010
16
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Figure 6: Optimal revenue maximizing top marginal tax rates (%) ( = 1
4
; 1
2
)
1993-2010
the -parameter was almost constant being around 2.5. Hence  = 2 reects
a low range estimate (high inequality) and  = 3 in turn a high range esti-
mate (low inequality). The Gini coecients estimated by this distribution
(Gini = 1=) are quite close to those calculated from the data. Interestingly
the location parameter m in our notations (median) in the Champernowne
distribution is quite close to that calculated from the data.
5 Optimal top rates for the dierent assumptions in
Finland
We employ the property of (8) to calculate optimal top income tax rates us-
ing reduced-form estimates of the taxable income elasticity for high incomes
(in section 4) and a Pareto parameter of Figure 3 from the Finnish income
distribution. Figure 6 displays our simple calculations based on the approx-
imation formula (8) for two dierent values of  over the period 1993-2010.
The rst and second ones,  = 1/4 and 1/2 are mid-range estimates in Table
1 and also in the recent survey by Saez et al. (2012).
Tables 2a and 2b illustrate with some parameter values top marginal tax
rates with dierent social objectives (utilitarian and revenue maximizing).
17
The top tax rate was 44.3 percent in 2010. Maximizing revenue on the high
earners implies that for example the current (2010) top rate in Finland has
gone beyond the top of the Dupuit-Laer curve if and only if  is larger
than 0.55 given a = 2.3. In Figure 7 we show the corresponding values for
elasticity from 1990 to 2010. Given our estimates on Pareto coecients and
elasticity, we are convinced that top tax rate varies between 50-67 %.
We can also consider the inverse problem of determining the social welfare
weight parameter ' for a given top tax rate. Assuming the labour supply
elasticity is equal to 0.5 (0.25) and Pareto parameter a as shown in Figure 3,
then we can calculate the welfare weights ' implied by the top tax rates in
Finland over the years 1990-2010 (Figure 8). For example in 2010 ' is equal
to 0.63 (0.39). The tax rates in Table 2a and b are based on the approxi-
mation formulas (8) and (9). They give smaller values than the asymptotic
rates. For example in the revenue maximizing case with a = 2 and  = 0.5
we have t = 50 % but the asymptotic rate with the same parameter values
is 60 % (from formula (6)).
Table 2a Utilitarian top marginal tax rates (%) for '= 13 and
1
2
a = 1.5 a = 2.0 a = 2.5 a = 3.0
' = 13
 = 0.25 64.1 57.3 51.7 47.2
 = 0.50 47.2 40.1 34.9 30.9
' = 12
 = 0.25 57.1 50.0 44.4 40.0
 = 0.50 40.0 33.3 28.6 25.0
Table 2b Rawlsian (maximizing revenue on the high earner) top
marginal tax rates (%) for ' = 0
a = 1.5 a = 2.0 a = 2.5 a = 3.0
' = 0
 = 0.25 72.7 66.7 61.5 57.1
 = 0.50 57.1 50.0 44.4 40.0
Responses to tax rates can also take the form of tax avoidance. Tax avoid-
ance can be dened as changes in reported income due to changes in the form
of compensation but not in the total level of compensation. In the Finnish
tax system tax avoidance opportunities arise when taxpayers can shift part of
their taxable labour income into capital income. As mentioned above income
shifting was possible in practice for the top 1 per cent of taxpayers i.e. for
18
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Figure 7: Revenue maximizing elasticity () in Finland 1990-2010
wealthy owners of closely held companies. Piketty et al. (2012) extend the
revenue maximizing top tax rate formula with the elasticity of tax avoidance.
The formula takes the following form t = (1+aA)
1+a
(see Piketty et al. 2012 for
a derivation), where A =
(1 t)dr
zd(t ) is the tax avoidance elasticity (r is shifted
income so that ordinary taxable income is a dierence between real income
and r) and shifted income is taxed at a constant and uniform marginal tax
rate  lower than t. For given  = 25 %19, we assume  = 0.5 (0.7)20,  =
0.3 (0.1), A = 0.2 (0.6)
21, a = 2 and  = 25 % then we obtain a revenue
maximizing top rate t = 55 % (54.2 %). What are tax policy implications
of top tax rates based on this formula with the avoidance elasticity? They
simply reect weaknesses of the tax system. In fact the optimal tax system
should minimize the income shifting channels.
For Pareto distributions, 1 H(z)
z h(z)
is constant. However, the empirical
19It was capital income tax rate in the 1993 reform).
20e = (d=z)e + eA where e is real labour supply elasticity, and the ordinary taxable
income z = d  r (d = real income).
21We chose the values of elasticities assuming that in Table 1 the elasticity based on the
1993 reform reects also income shifting but not the estimate of elasticity based on the
1989 reform.
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Figure 8: Social welfare weight parameter ', 1997-2010
Finnish income distribution is not a Pareto distribution at lower income
levels. Therefore we adopt the Champernowne distribution. Assume an
elasticity of 0.25, the social marginal welfare weight ' = 0.5 at the income
level corresponding to the top decile threshold is 0.5 where  = 2.5 i.e. 1 H(z)
z h(z)
= 0.51 (2010) and 1 F (n)
n f(n)
= 0.45. The optimal utilitarian marginal tax rate
at this income level is 51 per cent.
The nonlinear utility of consumption and the asymptotic marginal
tax rate
The special cases considered in the previous section yield insights but within
the framework of the assumptions made. How robust are these insights?
What happens when we move away from quasi-linearity? As we mentioned
in section 2 Mirrlees (1971) found that the asymptotic marginal tax rates
are sensitive to the nonlinearity of utility of consumption. We focus here
on an example with the Cobb-Douglas preferences and the Champernowne
20
distribution. In table 3 we compare asymptotic rate with the optimum
nonlinear tax rate (numerical) at the upper part of n-distribution.
Table 3 Asymptotic and numerical top marginal tax rates
u = lnx+ ln(1  y); f(n) = Champernowne
 = 2  = 2.5  = 3 F(n)
Asymptotic rate 67 57 50
Numerical rate20 50.1 40.4 33.8 99
20Tuomala (2006).
A number of interesting points emerge from the patterns in Table 3. There
are quite big dierences between the numerical and asymptotic rates. The
asymptotic solution is not a very accurate approximation for even top 1 per
cent with  = 2, 2.5 and 3. But this dierence is much smaller than in Mirrlees
(1971). The reason is that here we are using the distribution with a much
thicker upper tail than that one used in Mirrlees (1971). The asymptotic
rates are in line with those top rates we nd in many advanced countries.
It is perhaps slightly surprising to nd rather high tax rates with the Cobb-
Douglas preferences where the labour elasticity is rather high around 0.5 at
the income level of top one per cent. In the case  = 2.5 (2.0) the asymptotic
rate is 57 (67) per cent. The asymptotic tax of Mirrlees (1971: equation 66)
with the Pareto paramater equal to 2.0 is 60 per cent but his formula is not
in terms of labor supply elasticities instead of marginal utilities (see footnote
5 above).
6 Concluding remarks
The current (2010) top marginal rate for top 1 per cent in Finland is 44.3
per cent. The corresponding top tax rate was 62.7 per cent in 1990. With
the Pareto parameter a = 2.5, (2.0) the labour supply elasticity  = 0.25
yields revenue maximizing top marginal tax rate t of 61.5 per cent (66.7 per
cent) and utilitarian with positive welfare weight (1/3) yields t of 51.7 (57.3)
per cent. The more general case with the Cobb-Douglas preferences and a =
2.5 or  = 2.5 gives the top rate of 57 per cent. It is clear that this kind of
calculations of the optimal tax rate needs to recognize explicitly that there
is much uncertainty particularly related to supply elasticities and not only
to rely on one estimate. Notwithstanding one conclusion we can draw from
our application without any uncertainty is that the current top marginal tax
rate is not close to the top of the Dupuit-Laer curve.
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How to assess our results for top marginal tax rate depends also on
whether elements left out of the model change them. There are good reasons
to suspect that the labour market of top income earners deviates from the
standard competitive model in a number of important respects. Persson and
Sandmo (2005) investigate optimal income taxation in a \tournament" model
where wages are determined not by productivity but by one's productivity
relative to other workers. As they note, such a model might be particularly
relevant to the salaries of top executives. Would it therefore be a more suit-
able framework within which to examine the optimal top tax rate? There
are problems with the tournament explanation, however, and there is no real
evidence that it applies to executive pay. For example, tournaments might
provide poor incentives when it is apparent that one player is likely to win
and others likely to lose the competition (due to dierences in skills or other
qualities) (see Eriksson, 1999).
As suggested by Simula and Trannoy (2010) taking potential losses of
tax base due to migration into account can signicantly reduce the level
of the optimal top marginal tax rate. In a simple case this can be seen
by extending formula (6) adding migration eects using migration elasticity
. It is the elasticity of numbers with respect to after-tax income. We
have the following formula t = 1
1+a+
. From Table 2b we see that when
a=2 and =0.25, t=2/3. If there is migration with elasticity  = 0.4, then
the revenue maximizing tax rate decreases to 52.6. Thus, large migration
elasticities could indeed decrease signicantly the ability of countries to tax
high incomes. We should emphasize that this is a single-country optimum.
A single country does not recognize the external eects it might impose on
other countries by cutting its top tax rate. A global welfare perspective and
with complete scal coordination, the migration elasticity is not that relevant
for optimal tax policy.
Finally, if the economic activity at high incomes is primarily socially un-
productive rent-seeking, then it would be plausible to impose higher marginal
rates at top income levels than those calculated above.
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Appendix A Derivation of the equation (4)
The quasi-linear utility function u = x+V (1 y) is dened over consumption
x and hours worked y, with Ux = 1 and Vy < 0 (subscripts indicating partial
derivatives). Introducing multipliers  and (n) for the budget constraint
(3) and incentive compatibility constraint du
dn
=  yVy
n
= g and integrating by
parts, the Lagrangean becomes
L =
Z 1
0
((G(u) + (ny   x))f(n)  0u  g)dn+ (1)  (0)u(0): (A1)
With quasi-linear preferences dierentiating of the Lagrangean (A1) with
respect to u and y gives the rst-order conditions
Lu = (G
0   )f(n)  0(n) = 0 (A2)
Ly = (n+ Vy)f(n) + (n)
(Vy + yVyy)
n
= 0 (A3)
(A2) satises the transversality conditions
@L
@u(0)
= (0) = 0;
@L
@u(1) = (1) = 0:
Integrating in (A2)
(n) =
Z 1
n
[ G0]f(m)dm: (A4)
This latter satises the transversality conditions (0) = (1) = 0 [integrat-
ing in (A2) Z 1
n
d
dn
dn = (1)  (n)]:
The transversality conditions and (A3)imply (n) > 0, for n 2 (0;1).
The tranversality condition (n) = 0 yields  =
R1
0
G0[U(x)]f(p)dp.
From the rst order conditions of government's maximization, we obtain
the following condition for optimal relative marginal tax rate t(z); [Note:
t
1 t =
1
1 t   1 = UxnVy   1]
t
1  t = (1 +
yVyy
Vy
)
1
nf(n)
Z 1
n
[ G0]f(m)dm: (A5)
Multiplying and dividing (A5) by (1 F (n)) and with u = x  y1+ 1 =(1 + 1

)
we obtain the formula (6) in the text.
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We can also translates the analysis from n-space to z-space. In the lin-
earized income tax system when z(n) = ny(n(1   t)), dz=dn = y + (1  
t)ndy=d(n(1  t)) = n(1+ ). Let H(z) be the distribution function of house-
holds by income z (which equals ny and so is endogenous), with density
h(z).We have f(n) = H(z)y(1 + ). Hence and we can write (5A)
t
1  t =
1

(1 H(z))
zh(z)
(1 G0) (A6)
where
G0 =
Z 1
z
G0hdz0=(1 H(z)): (A7)
Appendix B An asymptotic solution of optimal tax problem
Now we consider a more general case with u = U(x) + V (1  y). Dene
v =
1 + Vy=nUx
Vy + yVyy
; (B1)
and rewrite (A3)
n2fv =
Z 1
n
(
1
Ux
  G
0

)f(n)dn = 0: (B2)
Dierentiating (B2) with respect to n and we have
dv
dn
=  v
n
(2 +
nf 0
f
) +
1
n2
(
G0

  1
Ux
) (B3)
(B3) and the incentive compatability constraint
du
dn
=  yVy
n
(B4)
two dierential equations in u and v, provide the solution to the optimal
income tax problem, together with the condition (B2) and at n = n0
22
n20f(n0)v0 =
Z n0
0
(
1
Ux
  G
0

)f(n)dn (B5)
22n0, largest n for which y(n) = 0, may be in some cases rather large. In the interval
[0; n0]; y = 0 and x = x0 and then u = U(x0)  V (0).
28
and the transversality condition (1) = 0 and (B2) require that
n2fv ! 0 (n!1): (B6)
The condition (B5) guarantees an accurate value for n0.
We analyze asymptotic marginal tax rates in the following case: The
utility function is u = logx + log(1   y). We denote s = 1   y and put
w = logn. Now we can write
v = s(s  x
n
): (B7)
For any social welfare function G with a property that limu!1G0(u) = 0 we
can simplify (B3)23 and if f(n) is the Champernowne distribution, then (B3)
becomes
dv
dt
=  v[1 


1   m
n

1 +
 
m
n
 ]  s(1  vs2 ): (B8)
Since
lim
n!1
nf 0
f
=  (1 + ) (B9)
we can rewrite
dv
dw
= v(   1)  s(1  v
s2
) (B10)
Hence from (B4) and noting that u = log n+ log(s  v
s
) + log s we have
du
dw
=
du
dn
dn
dw
= 1  1
s
ds
dw
+
[(1 + v=s2) ds
dw
  1
s
dv
dw
]
(s  v=s) =
1  s
s
: (B11)
Using (B11) we can write
ds
dw
=
v(1 + )  2s2
2s
: (B12)
Denote v
s2
= t i.e. the marginal tax rate. It follows that
ds
dw
=
s
2
[t(1 + )  2] (B13)
Dierentiating t = v
s2
with respect w and substituting dv
dw
from (B10) we
obtain
dt
dw
= t    t  1
s
(1  t)  2t ds
dw
1
s
: (B14)
23Equivalently we have a maximin case.
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t dt/dw’=0
1
ds/dw=0E
P
2/(1+ )
1/(1+ )
S=1/2 s 1
0
Figure 9: The solution to equation B13 and B15
Substituting to (B14) (B12) we have
dt
dw
= (1  t)[t(1 + )  1
s
]: (B15)
The solution to equation (B13) and (B15) is shown in Figure 8. The equations
are autonomous in the sense that the evolution of t and s or (1   y) is
independent of n0. Hence the solution of t is determined solely from (B13)
and (B15). For dt
dw
= 0, it has to be t = 1
(1+)
s and for ds
dw
= 0 in turn t = 2
1+
.
Hence we have a complete description of the solution in the case of the
Champernowne distribution. When the path to the singular solution starts
from s = 1, this implies that the marginal tax rates increase monotonically
from t = 1
1+
to t = 2
1+
.
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Appendix C
Data and income concept
The top income share estimates from 1980 to 1995 are based on the Tabulated
Income Data from Tax Tables (see Jantti et al. 2010) and from 1996 to
2010 estimates based on the Income Distribution Statistics (IDS). The IDS
data is a representative national sample. The concept of income is income
subject to taxation (referring in the text to taxable income). Income subject
to taxation also includes the deductions which are excluded from taxable
income. Eective marginal earned income tax rates are estimated with a
micro simulation model (JUTTA). Capital income tax rates are estimated
from the IDS data. We have restricted the data to cover member of the
population over 14 years of age in order to get two comparable databases.
Since 1989 several tax reforms have been implemented concerning per-
sonal taxation in Finland. The tax rates were reduced and the tax base was
broadened. Furthermore, in 1990 the full imputation system of corporation
taxes (avoir scal) was adopted to remove the double taxation of dividends.
Since 1993 Finland has applied the dual income tax system where earned
income is taxed at a progressive tax rate and capital income at a at tax
rate. The corporation tax rate and capital income tax rate were the same.
The tax rate was 25 per cent from 1993 to 1995, 28 per cent from 1996 to
1999 and 29 per cent from 2000 to 2004. In our analysis incidence of capital
taxation is straightforward: the shareholder also pays the corporation tax
of dividends. In the case of the avoir scal both capital income and earned
income were single-taxed.
The avoir scal tax system was abolished in 2005 and Finland switched
to the partial double taxation of dividends. At the same time the capital
tax rate was reduced to 28 per cent and the corporation rate to 26 per cent.
To avoid the double taxation of dividends, part of capital income became
tax free under personal taxation: 70 per cent of dividends were included in
the shareholders' capital income. Furthermore, for owners of privately held
businesses, dividends up to 90 000 euros (and dividends that were under 9
per cent of net wealth) were made tax exempt under individual taxation. As
a result of the reform the average eective capital income tax rates increased
for the top 1 per cent incomes in 2005.
The average eective marginal tax rates for the top 1 per cent incomes are
illustrated in Figure 10. Since 1996, the eective marginal tax rate for earned
income has decreased 10 per cent. At the same period average marginal tax
rate for capital income has increased. Variation after 2004 comes from the
uctuation of the tax free part in capital income.
Since 1993 the total marginal tax rate is the weighted average of earned
income and capital income. The total average tax rate for the top 1 per cent
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decreased until 2000 because of the substantial dierence between the earned
income and capital income marginal tax rates and considerable increase in the
capital income share (see Figure 1). The decrease of corresponding marginal
tax rates for the next 4 per cent incomes has been more modest and it has
stayed close to the marginal tax rate of earned income (see Figure 11).
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Figure 10: Marginal tax rates for top 1 percentiles
32
02
4
6
8
10
12
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
In
co
m
e
 s
h
a
re
, 
%
M
a
rg
in
a
l 
ta
x
 r
a
te
, 
%
Marginal tax rate for income subject to taxation (earned income)
Marginal tax rate for income subject to taxation (earned and capital income)
Share of top 95!99 % from income subject to taxation
Figure 11: Marginal tax rates and income shares for top 95-99 percentiles
33
Appendix D
Table D1 Elasticity estimates
Models a e b1 b2 b3 R2 D  W S:E:E:
Top 1 %
No time trend -0.938 0.671 0.759 0.507 0.042
(-34.9) (9.5)
Linear time trend -0.854 0.817 -0.002 0.765 0.510 0.042
(-8.71) (4.59) (-0.90)
Linear square trend -0.718 0.996 -0.011 0.000 0.792 0.597 0.040
(-6.06) (5.10) (-2.10) (1.88)
Cube time trend -1.033 0.289 -0.033 0.003 0.000 0.849 0.930 0.035
(-7.14) (1.02) (-3.91) (3.34) (-3.10)
log(S1;t) = constant+ e log(1 MTR1;t) + b1 trend+ b2 trend2 + b3 trend3 + "t
Models a e b1 b2 b3 R2 D  W S:E:E:
Top 95-99 %
No time trend -0.918 0.061 0.168 0.453 0.009
(-102.5) (2.42)
Linear time trend -0.946 0.003 0.000 0.186 0.457 0.010
(-25.6) (-0.04) (0.78)
Linear square trend -0.901 0.073 -0.002 0.000 0.392 0.625 0.008
(-25.3) (0.99) (-2.14) (3.03)
Cube time trend -0.939 -0.050 -0.008 0.001 0.000 0.748 1.460 0.005
(-41.7) (-1.05) (-7.60) (7.51) (-6.80)
log(Sk;t) = constant+ e log(1 MTRk;t) + b1 trend+ b2 trend2 + b3 trend3 + "t
Models a e b1 b2 b3 R2 D  W S:E:E:
Top 1 % as control top 95-99 %
No time trend 0.000 1.131 0.513 1.941 0.026
(0.09) (5.43)
Linear time trend 0.001 1.311 0.000 0.513 1.942 0.027
(0.07) (5.23) (-0.02)
Linear square trend -0.006 1.218 0.001 0.000 0.518 1.978 0.027
(-0.39) (4.99) (0.54) (-0.56)
Cube time trend 0.007 1.309 -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.531 2.040 0.027
(0.32) (5.02) (-0.56) (0.72) (-0.82)
[log(
S1;t
Sk;t
)   log( S1;t 1
Sk;t 1
)] = constant + e [log(
1 MTR1;t
1 MTRk;t )   log(
1 MTR1;t 1
1 MTRk;t 1 )] + b1 trend + b2 trend
2 +
b3 trend3 + "t
Parameter estimates: a = constant, e = elasticity, b1 = linear time trend, b2 = square time trend, b3 =
cube time trend.
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